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INTRODUCTION
The Editors of the Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy have
specifically requested that I address in this essay some research I finished
quite a while ago, but to which I hope to return in the near future, concerning the history of the first national legal committee of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).I Therefore, I plan to raise a big picture question left unanswered by that earlier
research here: how should we understand lawyers' class interests in relation to their involvement in the development of legal ethics rules concerning public interest law practice? This is a question that David
Wilkins led me to think about as a result of his comments on some research I published on the first national legal committee of the NAACP. 2
t Associate Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law.
I See Susan Carle, Elite Privilege and Public Interest Lawyering, 20 LAW & HIST. REVIEW

153 (2002) [hereinafter Wilkins Response] (responding to comments of Prof. David Wil-

kins); Susan Carle, From Buchanan to Button: Legal Ethics and the NAACP (Part 11), 8 U.
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 281 (2001) [hereinafter From Buchanan to Button]; Susan Carle,
Race, Class, and Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP (1910-1920), 20 LAW & HIST. REVIEW 97
(2002) [hereinafter Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP].
2 Wilkins Response, supra note 1.
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I will argue here that a fruitful avenue for further research on the intersection between class interests and professional regulation in the arena of
public interest 3 law is a focus on the operation of elite lawyers' power in
this context. This approach would seek to formulate ethical meanings
and values that encourage lawyers to become involved in public interest
projects, but also impose strong norms compelling restraint and critical
reflection about lawyers' use of their power in this context.
To present this argument, I first briefly summarize my research on
the first national legal committee of the NAACP and Wilkins' reaction to
my conclusions. I then sketch some of the leading approaches to the
question of how to theorize class interests in the development of professional ethics rules. Finally, I end with some preliminary conclusions and
future research directions.
I.

THE EARLY NAACP

I begin my summary of my research on the early NAACP by quoting heavily from my chief article on the subject, in order to dispel misconceptions that might otherwise be created by commentary later in this
symposium edition.
I opened that article by setting the stage for the NAACP's founding,
explaining:
By the late nineteenth century, African-American lawyers working in local communities had begun to experiment with the use of citizens' organizing committees to
challenge racial injustice. Plessy v. Ferguson was such a
case. African-American lawyer Louis Andre Martinet
organized a Citizens Committee to oppose Louisiana's
newly enacted "separate car" law which prohibited African-Americans from riding in train cars with whites and
called for making a "test case" to challenge the law's
3 1 use the term "public interest" here, despite its highly contested meanings, because

that is the term we have received historically to refer to lawyers' involvement in projects for
progressive social change. See generally Susan Carle, Re-valuing Lawyering for Middle- Income Clients, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 719, 729-30 (2001) (discussing contested definitions of
public interest law). The working definition of public interest law I like best is that which
focuses on the representation of otherwise under-represented interests, as in the Council for
Public Interest Law's definition:
Public interest law is the name that has recently been given to efforts to provide legal

representation to previously unrepresented groups and interests. Such efforts have
been undertaken in the recognition that the ordinary marketplace for legal services

fails to provide such services to significant segments of the population and to significant interests. Such groups and interests include the poor, environmentalists, con-

sumers, racial and ethnic minorities, and others.
COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: FINANCING PUBLIC

INTEREST LAW IN AMERICA 6-7 (1976).
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constitutionality.... These efforts resulted in a carefully
planned confrontation presenting the facts underlying
Plessy v. Ferguson, which may be the first example of a
civil rights organization using the "test case" terminology to describe a litigation strategy leading to the U.S.
Supreme Court.
By the turn of the century several civil rights organizations aspiring to national status had adopted the test case
concept to describe their litigation agendas. .

.

. [T]he

Constitution League-founded by industrialist John
Milholland and staffed by African-American lawyer Gilchrist Stewart, both of whom would go on to play roles
in the NAACP-likewise articulated plans to sponsor
test cases in the courts.
The most impressive effort to organize a national civil
rights organization to sponsor test cases prior to the
founding of the NAACP was the Niagara Movement, an
African-American group organized in 1905 at a meeting
in Niagara Falls, New York ....

[T]he Niagara Move-

ment's platform demanded civil rights in strong and unqualified terms. Its founding documents, drafted
primarily by [W.E.B.] Du Bois, articulated a plan to
"push test cases in the courts" challenging Jim Crow
cars and other practices. To this end, the Niagara Movement's founders established a "legal department" to
oversee nationally coordinated civil rights work. Active
in the department were lawyers such as W. Ashbie Hawkins, who would later play a key role at the local level in
early NAACP litigation campaigns. The Niagara Movement successfully challenged unequal accommodations
in interstate carriers before the Interstate Commerce
Commission and took part in other civil rights
cases .... 4
I then described the founding and operation of the NAACP's first
national legal committee, which directed the organization's legal strategy
in its earliest years.
As I explained:
Many of the lawyers who were pioneering creative public impact litigation techniques in civil rights cases at the
4 Legal Ethics and the Early NAACP, supra note 1, at 101-02 (footnotes and citations
omitted).
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time were African-Americans but none of them was on
the NAACP legal committee. These lawyers included
not only prominent activists such as McGhee and Haw-

kins, formerly of the Niagara Movement, but also African-Americans who were staff members at the
NAACP's New York offices, such as C. Ames Brooks,
an associate at William Wherry's law firm, who served
for a short time as "general attorney" for the NAACP in
its national office.
Another prominent African-American lawyer and civil
rights activist, Gilchrist Stewart, had served on the New
York City Vigilance Committee but was not among the
lawyers transferred to the national committee. Stewart,
an immigration lawyer in New York City, had been the
head of the New York Vigilance Committee before its
merger with the national committee. Active in organizing the Constitution League, Stewart had been employed
as an organizer and lawyer for the Constitution League,
with funding provided by John Milholland, the wealthy
manufacturer who later served on the NAACP's Board
of Directors. Stewart had also been allied with the Niagara Movement and was active in progressive Republican
politics in New York City.5
I described the role Hawkins played in devising the argument underlying one of the NAACP's early victories, Buchanan v. Warley,6 as
follows:
As was often the case, an African-American lawyer
working at the local level had done the initial work in
formulating the arguments to challenge these residential
segregation ordinances. That lawyer was William
Ashbie Hawkins, formerly of the Niagara Movement,
who subsequently built an NAACP branch in
7
Baltimore.
And I contrasted the early NAACP national legal committee's role
as follows:
The NAACP did not want to shut down all competing
civil rights litigation, however; such local experiments
were a source of new ideas that the NAACP might ap5 Id. at 113-14 (citations and footnotes omitted).

6 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
7 Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP, supra note 1, at 124-25.
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propriate for its national campaigns. On the other hand,
the NAACP wanted sufficient involvement to allow it to
take credit for as many civil rights victories as possible.
Even more important, the NAACP wanted to be able to
halt local efforts that appeared headed for disaster, since
adverse decisions could damage the rapidly developing
8
body of civil rights case law.
Here, I was describing the NAACP in its earliest years - the period
between 1910 and 1920, right after its founding. 9 This was at least ten
years before the most visionary lawyers of NCAAP fame, such as
Charles Hamilton Houston and Thurgood Marshall, arrived on the scene.
During this very early period, a small group of mostly white, elite New
York City practitioners managed the NAACP's national legal affairs. 10
In another article, which I discuss further below, I contrasted this early
period with Houston and Marshall's ethics experiences while at the
NAACP's helm in the 1930s and later.'1
A.

My

RESEARCH QUESTION

I became interested in the first national legal committee of the
NAACP because of a project I researched before turning to the NAACP,
in which I investigated the lawyers involved in drafting the first national
model canons of professional responsibility adopted by the American
Bar Association (ABA) in 1908.12 I've told the story behind that ABA
committee elsewhere, 13 so I will not repeat myself; for the purposes of
this topic, the relevant facts are that one of the commentators during the
process surrounding adoption of the 1908 canons was Charles Anderson
Boston. Boston practiced in a small, elite New York City law firm and
spent most of his professional time as an organizer and leader of bar
committees, especially in the area of legal ethics.' 4 Having read Boston's legal ethics speeches and reports, I knew that he was a fairly typical
"Progressive Era"' 5 champion of moderate reform causes, who deeply
8 Id. at 122-123; see also id. at 123-25 (describing NAACP's decision not to become
involved in McCabe case pioneered by non-NAACP affiliated African-American lawyers).
9 See generally id. at 100-08.
10 Id. at 105-15.
11 See From Buchanan to Button, supra note 1.
12 CANONS OF PROF. ETHICS [hereinafter ABA Canons], reprinted in AM. BAR Ass'N,
OPINIONS OF THE COMMrrTEE ON PROF. ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES WITH THE CANONS OF PROF.

(1957).
13 Susan Carle, Lawyers' Duty to Do Justice: A New Look At the History of the 1908
Canons, 24 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 1 (1999).
14 Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP, supra note 1,at 109-10.
15 I use this term as shorthand to capture a certain kind of optimistic, "can-do" mindset
among elite lawyer-reformer types in the early years of the twentieth century, rather than to
designate a definitive period in United States history. Cf.ARTHUR S. LINK & RICHARD L.
ETHICS ANNOTATED AND THE CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS ANNOTATED

576

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 12:571

and passionately believed in the project of improving and enforcing legal
ethics law. 16 I then saw Boston's name on a list of national legal committee members for the NAACP, which had already begun devising test
case litigation strategies that were in tension with traditional legal ethics
laws, as I will explain further below. The more I looked into this topic,
the more interested I became, as I found that the early NAACP was very
actively pursuing some quite unconventional litigation strategies.
By unconventional, I do not mean that lawyers had not previously
been using these strategies in civil rights litigation. To the contrary, as I
have discussed at greater length in my previous article,' 7 African-American lawyers had begun using such strategies far earlier in local communities - starting, in fact, as research pioneers like J. Clay Smith have
documented, quite early in the nineteenth century.18 By describing these
strategies as unconventional, I mean that they involved lawyers in forms
of conduct that were not, to put it delicately, patently permissible under
traditional legal ethics rules. I won't go through an exhaustive listing of
these contradictions or tensions since I've discussed them in detail elsewhere,' 9 but it is important at least to sketch them in order to convince
you of some points I'm going to make later. Following is a list of just
some of what the NAACP was doing prior to 1920.
First, it is clear that the NAACP was actively creating litigation
where none would have existed otherwise.2 0 This practice violated traditional rules of ethics that prohibited lawyers from "stirring up" litigation, 2 1 sometimes defined as barratry or champerty. The correspondence
MCCORMICK, PROGRESSIVISM 3-25 (1983) (discussing many different approaches to defining
progressivism as an historical period).
16 See, e.g., Charles A. Boston, The Recent Movement Toward the Realization of High
Ideals in the Legal Profession, in REPORT OF THE THIRTY-FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AM.
BAR Ass'N 761, 784 (1912) (describing ideals motivating Boston's commitment to legal ethics
codification project).
17 See Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP, supra note 1, at 101-03.
18 See J. CLAY SMITH, JR., EMANCIPATION: THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER: 18441944 96-97 (1993) (describing legal work of Robert Morris, Sr., the nation's second AfricanAmerican lawyer, challenging segregation in Boston schools in the 1840s).
19 See Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP, supra note 1, at 134-38.
20 See, e.g., id. at 116 (describing examples of the early NAACP's engineered, test case
litigation experiments); see also id. at 101-02 (describing earlier test case litigation experiments of African-American civil rights groups).
21 Canon 28 of the ABA's 1908 Canons of Professional Responsibility reads as follows:
28. Stirring Up Litigation, Directly or Through Agents.
It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in rare
cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. Stirring up
strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at common law. It
is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of action and inform
thereof in order to be employed to bring suit or collect judgment, or to breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those having any other
grounds of action in order to secure them as clients, or to employ agents or runners
for like purposes, or to pay or reward, directly or indirectly, those who bring or
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files of several of the major actors on the NAACP's first legal committee
are full of plans to create test case litigation. 22 In one case, legal committee members met with non-members and went out to New York City
theaters in mixed-race pairs to test compliance with a city ordinance
23
prohibiting race discrimination in places of public accommodation.
The committee planned a similar strategy, complete with plans for a
press conference at the end, in which one of the committee's members
would travel with an African-American friend on trains in the South that
24
offered overnight sleeping berths.
Another apparent ethical violation involved the solicitation of strangers as plaintiffs for NAACP litigation. At least for a time, an NAACP
staff lawyer systematically solicited such strangers, as he proudly reported to the NAACP Board of Directors in 1913.25 This lawyer ex-

plained his methods at the annual meeting. He had engaged a news
clipping service to look for reports from across the country of potential
civil rights violations. 2 6 After reading these clippings, he would instruct
the NAACP's national secretary to write letters to the victims of such
incidents, offering the NAACP's services should they wish to pursue legal remedies. It appears that more experienced hands on the NAACP's
legal committee put a stop to this practice, but, for a time, the NAACP,
by its own staff lawyer's report, was engaging in blatant solicitation of
clients, again in violation of legal ethics mandates.
Even when the NAACP wasn't soliciting strangers as clients, its
lawyers were frequently engaged in "client-construction" practices, of
influence the bringing of such cases to his office, or to remunerate policemen, court
or prison officials, physicians, hospital attachs or others who may succeed, under
the guise of giving disinterested friendly advice, in influencing the criminal, the sick
and the injured, the ignorant or others, to seek his professional services. A duty to
the public and to the profession devolves upon every member of the Bar having
knowledge of such practices upon the part of any practitioner immediately to inform
thereof, to the end that the offender may be disbarred.
American Bar Association Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 28 (1908) (italics in original),
reprinted in AM. BAR Ass'N, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITrEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND
GRIEVANCES WITH THE CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS ANNOTATED AND THE CANONS OF
JUDICIAL ETHICS ANNOTATED 25

(1957).

1, at 115-16 (describing this
correspondence).
23 Id. For other accounts of this campaign, see, e.g., The NAACP Begins, microformed on
22 Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP, supra note

3 THE CRISIS 205 (March 1912); CHARLES FLINT KELLOGG, NAACP: A HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE 123 (1967).

24 This second scheme did not come off as planned, however, because both men were
permitted to sleep in the "white" sleeping car on their first journey, see id. at 116 n.73, and a
second attempt was scuttled by the coming of the first World War. See B. JOYCE Ross, J.E.
SPINOARN AND THE RISE OF THE NAACP, 1911-1939 40-41 (1972).

25 See NAACP ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1913 27 (description by this lawyer, named Chapin
Brinsmade, of writing with "requests for information and offers of help" to individuals identi-

fied in newspaper reports as possible victims of discrimination).
26 Id.
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which the legal ethics bar establishment had disapproved. These involved the NAACP's legal representatives speaking at large meetings to
describe the organization's legal work and urge members of the audience
to contribute funds or sign up as plaintiffs. 27 This activity does not ap-

pear remarkable today, but it violated the bar associations' legal ethics
opinions of the period. 28 I could go on in this vein, but the basic point is
that even with legal advisors drawn from the highest echelons of the bar
establishment, the early NAACP was aggressively experimenting with
unconventional ways of mixing litigation and organization building
goals.
All of this is not, of course, to say that what the NAACP was doing
was in any way "wrong" or "bad." To the contrary, what the NAACP
27 E.g., Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP, supra note

1,at

121-22, 126-27 (describing

such speaking engagements and mass meetings in which early NAACP lawyers participated).
28 I describe these legal ethics opinions in detail in Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP,
supra note 1,at 133-38. One example of many includes an opinion concluding that it would
be "improper professional conduct" for an attorney, retained by a stockholder to bring suit
against a company, to advertise for other similarly situated stockholders and request them to
join with the client and contribute to the expense of such action. 2 COMMITTEE ON PROF.
ETHICS, Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, QUESTIONS AS TO PROPER PROF.
CONDUCT SUBMITTED TO AND ANSWERED BY THE COMMITrEE FROM MAY,

1925

TO JUNE,

1926

19-20 (1925). In another opinion, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
(ABCNY) asked whether it would be "professionally proper for an attorney who has been
consulted by several members of a club as to their legal rights" to address other members of
the club who had not sought such consultations and to offer to represent them professionally,
replied that "the proposed solicitation constitutes a breach of Canons 27 and 28." Association
of the Bar of the City of New York, Op. 13 (1925), inOPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEES ON PROF.
ETHICS OF THE Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK AND THE NEW YORK COUNTY

LAWYERS' ASSOCIATION 8 (Arthur A. Charpentier ed., 1956) [hereinafter OPINIONS OF THE NY
COMMITTEES ON PROF. ETHICS].

Similarly, the American Bar Association (ABA) decided that it would be unethical for an
association of lawyers to write letters to men in the armed services advising them of a potential
claim for back pay. ABA Comm. on Prof 1 Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 4 (1924), in
OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROF. ETHICS AND GRIEVANCES WITH THE CANONS OF PROF.
ETHICS ANNOTATED AND THE CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS ANNOTATED 43-44 (193 1) [herein-

after OPINIONS OF THE ABA COMMITTEE ON PROF. ETHICS]. Another ABA advisory opinion
found it unprofessional for lawyers employed by an automobile club to hold a meeting to
speak to the club's membership to organize support and raise funds for litigation to challenge a
new state licensing fee that would have adversely affected some of the club's members. Opinions of the ABA COMMITTEE ON PROF. ETHICS, Formal Op. 8, at 53-58.
Even when no attempt was made to represent the persons advised of their legal rights, the
bar associations disapproved this practice. The New York County Lawyers Association
(NYCLA), for example, when asked whether "it [is] professionally improper for an attorney,
voluntarily and unsolicited, to communicate to strange persons apparently ignorant of facts
upon which claims of substantial right might be urged or prosecuted by them . ..without
soliciting employment to prosecute such rights," responded that, "for an attorney voluntarily
and unsolicited to communicate to a stranger ... facts within the knowledge of the attorney,
upon which claims of substantial right might be urged or prosecuted, is tantamount to volunteering advice to bring a law suit and is comprehended within the condemnation of Canon 28."
New York County Lawyers Association Op. 199 (1922), in OPINIONS OF THE NY COMMITTEES
ON PROF. ETHICS, at

632, 633-34.
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did represents one of the most extraordinary achievements of collective
agency of the twentieth century. What I'm most interested in is how it
was that the rather conservative, establishment-type, primarily AngloSaxon men who sat on the NAACP's first legal committee championed
this work despite its tension with then-extant legal ethics rules.
One plausible explanation might be that these lawyers were not
aware of, or at least not thinking about, these rules. But Charles Anderson Boston and others 29 were directly and simultaneously involved in the
project of codifying, proselytizing about, and building enforcement
mechanisms in connection with the bar associations' legal ethics
projects. This fact rules out the explanation that no one was aware of
what legal ethics law proscribed, nor does it seem likely that Boston's
attitude was simply to overlook the NAACP's potential ethics breaches
with a wink and a nod. Boston was not that kind of a lawyer; his writings are full of passionate sincerity about the ethics enforcement project.
Thus, some other explanation must account for the NAACP's first
legal committee's apparent disregard for the dictates of legal ethics. I
concluded that the NAACP's legal committee members thought that their
actions were not subject to the ethics rules that applied to others because
they were doing "public interest" work. 30 The NAACP was not billing
its clients, and the elite lawyers who sat on the national legal committee
were not championing a cause on behalf of their own self-interests.
These lawyers either ran the bar associations or were close associates of
those who did. They knew their own motives were beyond reproach, and
they also knew that no one would misunderstand this.3 1 They did not
have to worry about being held accountable under rules designed for
others-that is, for practitioners far lower down in the profession's status
hierarchy, such as one unlucky lawyer who was disciplined in New York
City in 1915 for advertising that he was a "white lawyer who is a colored
man's friend."'32 The early NAACP lawyers, in contrast, by virtue of
their class standing and position within the bar, had the ability to adopt
informal practice norms that deviated from traditional legal ethics dictates. Their ability to do so, I further suggested, aided the NAACP's
national organization building efforts in its early years.
In another essay, I explored how these informal practice norms
eventually blossomed into a specific conception of how to practice public
interest law that had important implications for progressive legal reform
29 Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP, supra note 1,at 108-09 (describing involvement of
NAACP Legal Committee member, William Wherry, Jr., in legal ethics regulation).
Id. at 142-43.
Id. at 143-44.
In re Neuman, 169 A.D. 638, 639 (N.Y. 1915). Neuman was later charged with ambulance chasing and resigned from the bar. Legal Ethics and the Early NAACP, supra note 1,
at 135 n.136.

another
30
31
32

580

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 12:571

work in the United States throughout the twentieth century. 33 Almost
half a century later, the NAACP's conception of public interest law practice received the U.S. Supreme Court's imprimatur in NAACP v. Button. 34

Button held that the First Amendment protects nonprofit

organizations involved in political reform work from some forms of state
legal ethics disciplinary sanctions. Later cases followed Button, such as
In re Primus35 and its companion case, In re Ohralik,36 in protecting

public interest lawyers, but not lawyers acting for private interests, from
some forms of legal ethics discipline.
Button and its progeny reflect the important distinction drawn in
U.S. public interest law between legal work in the public interest-that
is, work for others, undertaken through not-for-profit organizations without payment from clients 37-and work in the private interest-meaning
work for which a lawyer accepts fees from clients. But that second
model was closer to the kind of civil rights work African-American lawyers were performing in their local communities at the time. 38 Their
work combined political, self-help, and remunerative considerations,
rather than separating each of these from the others, as in the elite lawyers' model. I have argued elsewhere that we should re-examine the
present-day implications of how we have drawn these lines defining public and private interest law. 39 I will not pursue those arguments here;

what is most relevant is the way in which the NAACP's first elite lawyers managed to project one particular model of public interest law far
into the future.
I also reflected on the contrast between the early lawyers' approach
to legal ethics regulation and the very different attitude toward legal eth33
34
35
36

See
371
436
436

From Buchanan to Button, supra note 1, at 300-07.
U.S. 415 (1963).
U.S. 412 (1978).
U.S. 447, 467-68 (1978).

37 See, e.g., NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR LAW PLACEMENT, JOBS & J.D.s: EMPLOYMENT

AND SALARIES OF NEW LAW GRADUATES-CLASS OF 2000, at 109 (2001) (defining public
interest employment as "positions funded by the Legal Services Corporation and others providing civil legal services as well as positions with private non-profit advocacy or causeoriented organizations, ...
non-profit policy analysis and research organizations and public
defenders").
38 See, e.g., Susan Carle, Re-envisioning Models for Pro Bono Lawyering: A Comparative Study of the Early NAACP and the National Consumers League, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER,
SOC. POL'V & L. 81, 85-86 (2001) [hereinafter Re-envisioning Models for Pro Bono Lawyering]; Carle, Re-valuing Lawyering for Middle-Income Clients, supra note 3, at 734-35.
39 See, e.g., Carle, Re-envisioning Models for Pro Bono Lawyering, supra note 38, at 94
(questioning effects of defining public interest law as only that law practiced by lawyers located in law jobs in which they can afford to accept no fees from clients in their "pro bono"
representations); Re-Valuing Lawyering for Middle-Income Clients, supra note 3, at 742 (arguing for creation of an alternative prestige hierarchy that would avoid the trap of the binary
public/private dualism and instead assign public interest value to legal representations in inverse relation to the social, economic, and political power of a lawyer's clients).

2003]

CLASS INTERESTS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION

581

ics strictures at a later period in the NAACP's history, during the time of
Charles Hamilton Houston and Thurgood Marshall. 40 As I document
with particular focus on Houston, and as Mark Tushnet first documented
with respect to Marshall, 4 1 these African-American lawyers were extremely concerned about the NAACP's vulnerability to legal ethics
charges-and for good reason, since prosecuting the NAACP for alleged
legal ethics violations constituted one of the southern states' most vicious
42
means of assault on the organization following its victory in Brown.
So that, in a nutshell, is an overview of my research on the
NAACP's first legal committee and its relationship to legal ethics regulation. The question becomes: What conclusions should we draw from this
story? Here the territory is so rich that I hate to try to fit it into conceptual boxes, but try I must, since the professional norms of my own place
and time require this kind of scholarship. So here it is: I suggest that the
early NAACP legal committee members' lack of concern about legal ethics norms reflected the operation of power in relation to those norms,
manifested outside formal institutional mechanisms such as rules revision commissions or legislative processes. In other words, to finally
bring this talk around to the theme of this Symposium, the NAACP's
elite early legal committee members operated outside the realms traditionally defined as "politics" or "policy" in shaping legal ethics norms to
fit their agendas and world views. That was my thesis, but Professor
Wilkins did not completely agree with it.

B.

WILKINS' RESPONSE

In response to my argument, Professor Wilkins suggested-very
kindly, but disagreeing nonetheless-that perhaps I spent far too many
pages worrying about what the early lawyers on the NAACP's legal
committee thought they were doing.4 3 Instead, Wilkins suggested, a far
shorter and analytically cleaner way of capturing the phenomenon about
which I was writing was to conceive of the involvement of elites in public interest law movements as an effort to uphold their class advantages
by mitigating the harshness of the political regimes that upheld their
40 Carle, From Buchanan to Button, supra note 1, at 285-98.
41 See, e.g., MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL
AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961, at 153, 272-300 (1994).

42 See generally id. at 272-300 (describing southern states' legal campaigns against the
NAACP on legal ethics and other grounds); Walter F. Murphy, The South Counterattacks: The
Anti-NAACP Laws, 12 W. POL. Q. 371, 371-90 (1959) (providing a good contemporaneous
account of this litigation); From Buchanan to Button, supra note 1, at 298-300 (summarizing
the anti-NAACP campaigns with a particular focus on legal ethics charges).
43 See David B. Wilkins, Class Not Race in Legal Ethics: Or Why Hierarchy Makes
Strange Bedfellows, 20 L. & HIST. REV. 147, 147-48 (2002) ("Carle offers a complex and
nuanced explanation.... Yet, as I read her account, I could not help thinking about a simpler,
admittedly more vulgar explanation for the paradox Carle describes .... ).
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privilege. 44 On this theory, by advocating the elimination of overt, de
jure racism, the NAACP lawyers in my study were working to soften the
edges of a political and legal system that kept African-Americans at the
bottom of the heap. This argument posits that these lawyers were working in their own class self-interest even when they purported to be, and
believed themselves to be, engaging in public interest work in the interests of others of a different, less advantaged class.
In support of these general observations, Wilkins highlights historian Jerold Auerbach's highly engaging accounts of lawyers' ethical selfregulation projects at the turn of the twentieth century. 45 As Wilkins
explains, Auerbach argues that "the lawyers who drafted the original canons of ethics were quite clear in their belief that the rules they crafted
were intended to stamp out the practices of the new generation of immigrant lawyers whom these Brahmans viewed as a threat to their status as
independent professionals. '46 Extrapolating from the motives Auerbach
detects in the early twentieth century campaign to standardize and promote legal ethics codes for the practicing bar, Wilkins suggests that it
similarly "is not surprising that Boston and his colleagues did not believe
that rules against such 'crass' commercial practices as ambulance chas'47
ing applied to their own noble endeavors.
I disagreed with Wilkins in part, for reasons I will discuss further
below. Our exchange led me, however, to think more about how we
should understand class interests in thinking about the intersection of
professional regulation and public interest practice. That thinking is far
from complete, but what I want to do in the following two parts of this
Essay is, first, to note briefly some of the leading approaches to understanding lawyers' self-regulation in this context, and second, to make
some tentative suggestions about future research directions.
II.

SOME LEADING APPROACHES TO THE QUESTION OF
CLASS INTERESTS IN PROFESSIONAL REGULATION

Instead of attempting to survey the theoretical literature on professional regulation here, I will focus on several approaches advocated by
some leading scholars in the U.S. legal community who study professional regulation. The four scholars whose approaches I will briefly examine are: Jerold Auerbach, the source on which Wilkins primarily
44 /e. at 151 ("By supporting the work of public interest organizations like the NAACP,

elite lawyers from Boston's day to our own have been able to portray the bar's public aspirations as reality without having to significantly alter their own practices, which frequently undermine the public framework that advocacy organizations seek to protect.").
45 Id. at 148 (citing JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL
CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA

46 Id.
47

Id.

(1976)).
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relies; Terrence Halliday, who conceives of legal ethics regulation as a
solution to collective action problems in much the same way as commentator Jeffrey Standen does in this Symposium; Richard Abel, who adopts
a far more cynical view of most professional regulation, yet takes a different approach to public interest law; and Robert Gordon, who uses an
historical, interpretative perspective to examine late nineteenth-century
lawyers' understanding of what they were doing in their civic reform
projects.
I have already touched on Auerbach in relation to Wilkins' response
to my NAACP research. Wilkins' vast and powerful opus of legal ethics
scholarship takes sociological and analytical tracks very different from
Auerbach's, 48 so it would be incorrect to associate Auerbach's approach
49
with Wilkins generally. As Wilkins notes in his response to my article,
Auerbach most powerfully presents his view in a scathing critique of the
48 David Wilkins' legal ethics scholarship is characterized by a great breadth of interests
and concerns. In his earlier work, Wilkins applied a new institutionalist framework to assess
the question of the comparative institutional competence of varying approaches to legal ethics
regulation. See, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARv. L. REV.
799 (1992) (evaluating comparative institutional competence of various enforcement mechanisms for regulating lawyer conduct); David B. Wilkins, Afterword, How Should We Determine Who Should Regulate Lawyers ?-Managing Conflict and Context in Professional
Regulation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 465 (1996) (responding to various critiques about an earlier
article). He is also renowned for his major contributions in pioneering the conceptual apparatus for thinking about contextual approaches to legal ethics regulation. See, e.g., David B.
Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholar, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
1145 (1993) (arguing for greater attention to varying practice contexts in setting regulatory
policy on lawyers' professional conduct). He has served as an insightful and timely commentator on variety of legal ethics issues, such as the Kay Scholer/thrift savings and loans fiasco.
See, e.g., id.
But the work of his I most admire includes his prodigious empirical and theoretical examination of the career trajectories of African-American lawyers with the most elite law school
educations, see, e.g., David B. Wilkins & G. Muti Gulati, Why are There So Few Black Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms?:An InstitutionalAnalysis, 84 CAL. L. REV. 493 (1996); of the
subtle but extremely powerful force of continuing race discrimination in the legal profession,
see, e.g., id.; and of complicated and difficult questions involving the intersection of race
identity and legal ethics, see, e.g., David B. Wilkins, Identities and Roles: Race, Recognition,
and ProfessionalResponsibility, 57 MD. L. REV. 1502 (1998) (criticizing "bleached out" professionalism, which views lawyers' professional identities as subsuming all of other prior aspects of identity); David B. Wilkins, Race, Ethics, and the FirstAmendment: Should a Black
Lawyer Represent the Ku Klux Klan?, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1030 (1995) (exploring ethical
considerations in African-American lawyer's decision about whether to represent the Ku Klux
Klan on freedom of speech issue); David B. Wilkins, Straightjacketing Professionalism:A
Comment on Russell, 95 MIcH. L. REV. 795, 819 (1997) ("it is critical that black Lawyers find
creative ways to balance their competing commitments to their communities, to their jobs, and
to their unique aspirations as human beings"); David B. Wilkins, Two Paths to the
Mountaintop?: The Role of Legal Education in Shaping the Values of Black Corporate Lawyers, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1981 (1993) (arguing for the importance of exploring in the course of
legal education questions concerning black corporate lawyers' moral obligations running to the
black community).
49 David B. Wilkins, Class Not Race in Legal Ethics: Or Why HierarchyMakes Strange
Bedfellows, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 148 (2002), citing AUERBACH, supra note 45.
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ABA's initiative in drafting the national model legal ethics canons in
1908. 1 will therefore focus on Auerbach's treatment in Unequal Justice5° of that early twentieth-century legal regulation project.
A.

AUERBACH'S APPROACH

Auerbach and I have both studied the historical record underlying
the ABA's initiative in drafting the first national model legal ethics canons, finalized in 1908. In some respects, I agree with Auerbach's characterizations when he describes the leading ABA players' motives in that
project as crassly and obviously based in class and, as he also emphasizes, in ethnic self-interest. Auerbach documents the desire of ABA
leaders to keep newcomers out of the profession so as to preserve their
traditional market monopoly on the "gentlemanly" 5' profession of law.
And, indeed, these lawyers' self-articulated explanations of their conduct
are rife with blatant admissions as to these less-than-laudable motives.
One example is particularly relevant because the speaker was none
other than Charles Anderson Boston, a figure active both in the legal
ethics codification project and the early NAACP. 5 2 In his writings, Boston frequently argues in favor of stronger legal ethics regulation in such
terms as the need to combat "the ambitious and intellectual capacity of
Oriental immigrants, with no apparent conception of English or Teutonic
ideals," 53 or the need to prevent the practice of law in New York City
from passing "into the hands of those, who, iftheir names are significant, are not schooled by previous environment in the high traditions of
the English and American Bar."'54 Thus, I have no quarrel with
50 This work has become almost a canonical text today, excerpted in many of the leading
legal ethics textbooks on the market today. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE & DAVID LUBAN,
LEGAL ETHICS 58-61 (3d ed. 2001) (excerpting Unequal Justice); see also RICHARD A. ZITRIN
& CAROL M. LANGFORD, LEGAL ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW Xi-Xiii (2d ed. 2001).
51 The powerful historical resonance of lawyering as a "gentlemanly" profession takes
various forms in contemporary legal ethics scholarship. See, e.g., ANTHONY T. KRONMAN,
THE LOST LAWYERS: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION I1-17 (1993) (lamenting the
decline of the image of the gentleman lawyer); THOMAS L. SCHAFFER & MARY M. SCHAFFER,
AMERICAN LAWYERS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES 30-126 (1991) (arguing that the vision of lawyers as gentlemen can be resurrected while also expanding this concept so as to include traditionally excluded outsiders, such as women and lawyers of color). The conceptions of class
identity powerfully embedded in the concept of a "gentleman" merit far greater exploration.
Indeed, the historical connections between being a gentleman and a member of the upper class
in relation to conceptions of lawyering present one of many possible examples of the rich
territory yet to be explored in examining the connections between issues of class and lawyers'
ethical norms.
52 Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP, supra note 1,at 109-10.
53 Charles A. Boston, A Code of Legal Ethics, in 20 THE GREEN BAG 224, 228 (Sydney
R. Wrightington ed., 1908).
54 Charles A. Boston, The Recent Movement Toward the Realization of High Ideals in
the Legal Profession, in 37 REPORT OF THE THIRTY-FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AM. BAR

ASS'N 761, 784 (1912) (emphasis added) (citing list of names reflecting diverse ethnic ori-
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Auerbach's claims that a salient motive in the turn of the century professional regulation project was the preservation of insiders' monopoly on
law practice.
Nevertheless, while excluding outsiders and protecting traditional
insiders' monopoly over law practice clearly explains some of the motivations underlying the 1908 canons and provides the main purpose underlying some of their provisions, this does not necessarily mean that the
same motivations and purposes underlie all of the proposed regulations.
One example concerns an issue Auerbach incorrectly characterizes in his
discussion in Unequal Justice, that concerning the ABA's debate over
the ethical permissibility of charging contingent fees. 55 I will examine
this debate in some depth here to demonstrate concretely how an oversimplistic Auerbachian approach to the U.S. bar's professional regulation
56
projects could lead us astray.
In order to understand the contingent fee debate that took place during the ABA meeting where the 1908 Canons finally won approval, it is
helpful to understand the chronological sequence of ethical pronouncements on contingent fees that preceded the 1908 debate. Pennsylvania
lawyer George Sharswood's 1854 essay on professional ethics, which is
commonly but mistakenly assumed to be the direct basis for the 1908
canons, resoundingly condemned contingent fees, stating as follows:
"[A]greements between counsel and client that the compensation of the
former shall depend upon final success in the lawsuit-in other words
contingent fees-however common such agreements may be, are of a
very dangerous tendency, and to be declined in all ordinary cases. '57
In the place of this blanket condemnation of contingent fees, the
1887 Alabama Code of Professional Ethics, which was the direct antecedent to the 1908 canons, permitted the use of contingent fees but continued to contain language disfavoring and criticizing the practice. 58 Thus,
gins). On the prevalence of anti-Semitism among the leaders of bar associations at the time,
see AUERBACH, supra note 45, at 102-29; JOHN AUSTIN MATZKO, THE EARLY YEARS OF THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 1878-1928 231, 234-46, 344-45, 449-50 (UMI Dissertation
Services 1996) (1984).

55 For the sake of the nonlawyers whom I hope might be among my reading audience, I
note that Black's Law Dictionary explains that a contingent fee is "[a] fee charged for a lawyer's services only if the lawsuit is successful or is favorably settled out of court. Contingent

fees are ... calculated as a percentage of the client's net recovery (such as 25% of the recovery
if the case is settled, and 33% if the case is won at trial)." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed.

1999).
56 See also Alfred L. Brophy, Race, Class, and the Regulation of the Legal Profession in
the Progressive Era: The Case of the 1908 Canons, 12 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 607
(relying on Auerbach's interpretation of 1908 contingency fee debate).
57 George Sharswood, Essay on Professional Ethics, reprinted in 32 REPORTS OF THE
AM. BAR Ass'N 9, 153 (5th ed. 1907).

58 Thomas Goode Jones, another influential late nineteenth century legal ethics commentator, drafted the Alabama Code of Professional Ethics. For a discussion of Jones and the
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Section 51 of the Alabama Code of Professional Ethics stated: "Contingent fees may be contracted for; but they lead to many abuses, and certain compensation is to be preferred."5 9 This language appeared without
modification in the first circulating draft of the 1908 Canons proposed by
the ABA ethics committee charged with the task of drafting the first na60
tional model ethics code.
In response to comments from Charles Biddle of Philadelphia, 6 1 a
prominent outside commentator on this draft, the committee modified the
language quoted above to provide: "Contingent fees may be contracted
for; but they lead to many abuses, and should be under the supervision of
the court."' 62 The committee sent this language to the ABA in 1908, and
it sparked the debate about contingent fees that Auerbach interprets in
63
Unequal Justice.
Auerbach correctly explains that a progressive senator, Thomas J.
Walsh of Montana, challenged the ABA ethics committee's language on
contingent fees and argued that the provision should be struck. A
lengthy debate ensued, in which many strong voices argued on both sides
of the issue and several participants acknowledged that they sometimes
accepted contingent fees in their own practices. 64 These facts belie
Auerbach's overly dramatic characterization that "nothing plunged the
professional elite deeper into despair than contingent fees and the
proliferation of negligence lawyers whose practice depended upon
them."' 65 Even among the elite lawyers present at the ABA's annual
drafting of 1887 Alabama Code, see Allison Marston, Guiding the Profession: The 1887 Code
of Ethics of the Alabama State Bar Association, 49 ALA. L. REV. 471, 471-507 (1998).
59 REPORT OF THE THIRTIETH ANNUAL

MEETING OF THE AM. BAR Ass'N

710 (1907)

(quoting the Alabama code provision on contingent fees).
60 Id. at 710 (§ 57).
61 See Lucien H. Alexander, Memorandum for Use of ABA's Committee to Draft Canons
of ProfessionalEthics 2, 70 (1908) [herinafter 1908 Committee Memo]. This was an invaluable historical document, marked "strictly confidential," which I found through the help of
librarian Adeen Postar of the Georgetown University Law Center when I was researching my
article of the 1908 canons. It had been misfiled in a microfilm collection of old ABA materials
housed at the Catholic University Law Library (under call number KF 325.1276.M45 1908),
and probably was not available to Auerbach in his research.
62 Id. at 70 (emphasis supplied to replacement language).
63 See AUERBACH, supra note 44, at 43-48 (discussing debate within ABA about 1908
canon provision on contingent fees).
64 See, e.g., AM. BAR Ass'N, REPORT OF THE THIRTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING OF THE
AM. BAR ASS'N 77 (1908) [hereinafter 1908 REPORT] (comments of J.R. Keaton, of
Oklahoma) ("I think most of us have on occasions accepted employment on contingent fees
and I don't think any of use could be accused of anything dishonorable, or violating professional ethics in accepting that employment."); id. at 84 (comments of F.C. Robertson) ("[His]
services have been sought, as have those of many other attorneys, by men who have not the
means to pay a lawyer to represent them.").
65 AUERBACH, supra note 44, at 45.
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meeting, 66 there was a deep division of opinion. The context in which
the debate about the ethics of contingent fees took place is more complicated than Auerbach allows.
The floor debate produced the final compromise language that appears in the 1908 version of the canons. Jacob M. Dickinson, a member
of the ABA ethics committee that had presented the draft version to the
full meeting, offered this language. 67 Dickinson argued "because there
are some states that do not permit" contingent fees, "I do not think we
ought to give an expression on that subject, and we ought not to go on
record as making a general declaration." Instead, Dickinson proposed
the canons read as follows: "Contingent fees, where sanctioned by law,
should be under the supervision of the Court, in order that clients may be
protected from unjust charges. '68 It is this language that appears in the
1908 version of the Canons of Professional Ethics. 69
Auerbach claims that the final language adopted in 1908 was "more
restrictive" than the original language proposed by the ethics committee. 70 This claim is dubious. In the first place, the ABA removed the
language that disapproved of contingent fees-namely, that referring to
contingent fees "leading to many abuses." This change made the language somewhat less condemnatory; as Charles Wolfram, author of a
definitive treatise on legal ethics explains, the contingent fee language
adopted by the 1908 ABA Annual Meeting was "slightly less wary" than
language originally proposed. 7' Secondly, attendees at the ABA meeting
accepted this language as a compromise between those who wanted to
condemn and those who wanted to remain neutral on the ethics of contingent fees as a general matter. Indeed, a fact that Auerbach neglects to
mention is that some of those opposing the ethics committee's originally
72
offered language supported the compromise version.
In support of his interpretation, Auerbach claims that the "critical
change was to couple judicial scrutiny with a states-rights position that
limited ABA acquiescence to those jurisdictions that permitted contin66 On the elite professional status of the lawyers involved in the ABA during these years,
see MATZKO, supra note 54, at 229-30.
67 For biographical information on Dickinson, see Carle, supra note 13, at 34, 38.
68 The ABA again amended this language at its annual meeting in 1933 to provide that
"[a] contract for a contingent fee where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the
circumstances of the case, including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should
always be subject to the supervision of a Court, as to its reasonableness." ABA Canons, supra
note 12, at 12.
69 Id. at 12 n. to Cannon 13.
70 AUERBACH, supra note 45, at 46.
71 CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS 527 n.12 (1986).
72 See, e.g., 1908 REPORT, supra note 61, at 78 (comments of David Withington of Hawaii, Francis James of Ohio, and James Gibson of California) (moving to strike out the words
"lead to many abuses"); id. at 80 (speakers Withington and James) (withdrawing their amendment in favor of Dickinson's amendment).
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gent-fee arrangements. '73 But this analysis misrepresents the ABA's authority to promulgate model rules. Dickinson was right that the ABA's
jurisdiction did not extend to overruling existing state laws. To the extent that state law conflicted with the model rules, state law clearly
trumped the ABA's proposals. Therefore, the ABA had little choice but
to acknowledge the potential existence of state law restricting use of contingent fees and to tailor its model rule to accommodate this potential
circumstance.
Auerbach further asserts that the "legality of the contingent fee[was] assumed to be 'beyond legitimate controversy' " 7 4 He cites Stanton v. Embrey75 as his sole authority for this broad claim, but in fact that
case simply holds that contingent fee arrangements are legal in that
court, acknowledging that, "in some jurisdictions," a defense against en'76
forcement of a contingent fee contract "would be a good one." Wolfram states that prohibitions against contingent fees "obtained for a long
time in many states in the United States" and that the last state to repeal
such statutory prohibitions did not do so until 1965. 77 Indeed, it is easy
to find cases decided between 1900 and 1908 in which state courts disapproved the use of contingent fee arrangements in particular cases.78
In short, a careful examination of the historical record reveals that
the conclusions to be drawn from the debate about contingent fees during
the 1908 canons approval process are far more complex that Auerbach
intimates. To be sure, some vocal participants spoke against contingent
fees, but others spoke in the opposite direction. Speakers in the debate,
and in earlier internal deliberations of the ethics committee, openly aired
the issues about access to justice for impoverished accident victims that
Auerbach highlights.7 9 Finally, and most significantly, Auerbach erroneously claims that the floor amendment, brought on by Walsh's attack on
73 AUERBACH, supra note 45, at 47.
74 Id. at 45 (quoting Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U.S. 548 (1876)).
75 93 U.S. 548 (1876).
76 Id. at 556.
77 WOLFRAM, supra note 71, at 527. The last state to repeal its statutory prohibition on

contingent fees was Maine. Id.
78 See, e.g., Dorr v. Camden, 46 S.E. 1014, 1018 (1904) (disallowing contingent fee

collection where attorney had not shown sufficient skill and judgment to warrant such a fee);
Newman v. Freitas, 61 P. 907, 910 (1900) (holding contract requiring payment of contingent
fee in divorce action void and unenforceable as against public policy); cf.Taylor v. Enthoven,
88 N.Y.S. 138 (1904) (voiding contingent fee contract in which attorney also agreed to advance court costs). Some of the limitations on contingent fees recognized in these cases still
survive, including, as Wolfram explains, in "criminal defense, domestic relations, and, in some
states, lobbying." WOLFRAM, supra note 71, at 527.
79 At the committee deliberations stage, for example, New York City lawyer Edward B.
Whitney, who was active in the tenement house movement, argued that the "contingent fee is

much the fairest to a poor client" and stated that he personally preferred to use contingent fees
"when I am representing a person who would suffer hardship if he paid anything like a reason-

able fee in the case of defeat." 1908 Committee Memo, supra note 61, at 71-72.
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the committee's language disfavoring contingent fees, was worse than
the original language; it was in fact somewhat less condemnatory, having
been offered as a compromise position.
All of this is not to say, of course, that the ABA's final action on the
contingent fee issue was the best that progressive forces could have
hoped to achieve. Instead, it is simply to say that, within its historical
context, Auerbach is overreaching in claiming that the "class and ethnic
biases that appeared in the Canons were nowhere more evident than in
the special treatment reserved for contingent fees." 80 Auerbach's account does not capture the complexity of motives and outcomes, even
with respect to the very provision of the 1908 canons on which he focuses in making his case.
Thus, one problem with forcing explanations of complex historical
phenomena into an all-encompassing theoretical approach is that this
tends to distort the complexity of the historical record. Still another
problem is that this approach tends to explain both too little and too
much. It explains too little because it completely dismisses what the actors it studies thought they were doing. The early NAACP lawyers I
studied did not think of themselves as trying to preserve their class interests through their involvement in the NAACP; they thought they were
helping others and that doing so was a good, altruistic thing to do. But
Auerbach and others working in the same vein dismiss the actors' selfconceptions of their motivations as irrelevant. 8 1 Now, I agree that it is
legitimate to say that such self-conceptions can be seriously misguided,
but to say that they are in no way relevant is to lock us into a world that
fails to account for the richness and power of internally constructed
meanings and motivations. Thus, if only from the perspective of aesthetics or intellectual taste, arguments that all legal ethics regulation is based
exclusively on the promotion of lawyers' class interests seem to prove
too little.
On the other hand, such arguments can also prove too much. It is of
course true that many people-or, at least, those who feel an obligation
to devote some of their professional energy to public service-try to
80 AUERBACH, supra note 45, at 44 (emphasis added).
81 In a similar way, for example, Auerbach argues that the professional self-regulation
project aimed at raising standards for admission to law school and to the bar, though selfprofessedly directed at improving the quality of legal services to the public, in fact had the
very different, self-interested motive of keeping out of the profession those so-called "newcomers"-immigrants and those of lower socio-economic classes - who were beginning to
compete with the traditional "blue blood" insiders who had previously enjoyed a monopoly in
law practice. AUERBACH, supra note 45, at 74-101. Auerbach is not the only one to make this
point, as I will discuss further below, but the fact that a very convincing story can be told with
respect to the bar's efforts to impose and raises "barriers to competition" on these issues does
not necessarily mean that the same explanatory paradigm can be imposed with respect to all
dimensions of professional regulation.
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work toward creating a "better" world. These social reformers tend to
use the values in their historical and social circumstances that they endorse to challenge the aspects of their historical and social circumstances
that they find less than ideal. 82 Thus, for example, it seems correct at
one level to say that the early NAACP lawyers were working to soften
the edges of capitalism by eliminating de jure racism.8 3 But if it is true
that all reformers work at some level to preserve what they value in their
social world and at the same time to change what they oppose about it,
then an approach to explaining lawyers' social reform efforts focused
exclusively on the promotion of their class interests proves too much.
All reformers seek to retain aspects of their social environment to which
they do not object along with advocating for change in features they
oppose.
A final reason why I think strong arguments following Auerbach's
theories are not sufficiently useful or interesting is because of their normative implications. That a theory has unattractive normative implications does not, of course, provide sufficient grounds to reject it if it
seems to have superior explanatory power. When none of a number of
competing explanations seems to have the upper hand, however, it seems
entirely relevant to compare the explanations' normative dimensions.
This is especially germane in the context of social science because, as
philosophers of the social sciences have pointed out, explanations of
84
human behavior shape the behavior observed.
The normative implications of arguments that lawyers always and
only promote their class interests in engaging in social reform efforts are
far from appealing. If the best way to think about elite lawyers' involvement in public interest work is that it is in fact directed at preserving their
82 This is the theory of social change held by the American pragmatists. See, e.g., John
Dewey, Outline of a Critical Theory of Ethics: the Formation and Growth of Ideals, in THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF JOHN DEWEY, 3 EARLY WORKS 1882-1898, at 359 (Jo Ann Boydston

ed., 1969) (arguing that reflective intelligence cross questions existing morality and criticizes it
by pointing out "the inconsistencies, incoherencies, compromises, and failures between actual
practice and the theory at the basis of this practice"); Cornel West, Radical Historicism, in
CORNEL WEST, THE ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF MARXIST THOUGHT 1, 3 (1991) ("The point is
not to lift oneself out of the flux of history-an impossible task-but rather to immerse oneself
more deeply into history by consciously identifying with-and digesting critically the values
of-a particular community of tradition.").
83 There is, indeed, literature on this point. See, e.g., B. JOYCE Ross, J.E. SPINoARN AND
THE RISE OF THE NAACP, 1911-1939, at 13-14 (1972). Among many other important roles in
the early NAACP, Joel Spingarn was a non-lawyer member of the NAACP's first national
legal committee. Spingarn's biographer points out that Spingarn strongly endorsed capitalism
as a method of economic organization, and that he and his close friend, W.E.B. Du Bois,
whose views on the need for economic redistribution were far more radical, frequently clashed
on this issue.
84 See, e.g., 2 CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: PHILOSOPHI-

PAPERS 104 (1985) (noting that because "political theories are about our practices ... their
rise and adoption can alter these practices.").
CAL
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own class privilege, then the best message to send elite lawyers about
whether they should care about social reform is: "No, please stay out of
this!" Now that may in fact be the right message, but it is not selfevidently obvious that it is. It does appear to be the attitude of a great
many practicing corporate lawyers today, who stay away from civic reform activities. The ethic of civic participation and pro bono service that
motivated the early NAACP lawyers seems to have greatly diminished in
the profession.8 5 But a great many advocates who are committed to providing more legal services to the poor and disenfranchised have argued
that the decline in pro bono service hours among lawyers in corporate
law firms is a very bad development. 86 Thus, I think we need to think
more about how, and to what extent, our professional norms should expect social reform work from the profession's elite, and that a perspective along the lines of Auerbach's analysis is largely unhelpful in that
thinking. We must look elsewhere for sources of theory helpful to our
query.
B.

THEORIES BASED ON SOLVING MARKET FAILURE PROBLEMS

A second popular theoretical approach to the study of legal ethics
regulation views the development of lawyers' ethics rules as a response
to problems of market failure. There are many variants of this approach.
One nicely presented by commentator Jeffrey Standen applies a law-andeconomics analysis to the issue. Standen argues that my concern with
Wilkins' claims that the early NAACP lawyers may have been using
their positions "to promote personal or class interests, instead of the interests of the litigation clients that the NAACP served," 87 is misplaced.
This is because, on Standen's theory, lawyers acting in their self- or class
interests in regulating their profession nevertheless can be expected to,
and in fact have, "produced a body of rules that serve the public good."8 8
Standen gives some examples to support his theory. But many other ex85 See, e.g., 1990-1999 The Way We Were, AM. LAW 100 at http://www.law.com /special/professionals/amlaw/amlawlOO/amlawlOO the way.html (last visited Feb. I1, 2003) (de-

tailing the increase in earnings in the top 100 law firms in the 1990s and corresponding thirtyfive percent decrease in pro bono activity).
86 See, e.g., THE LAW FIRM AND THE PUBLIC GOOD (Robert A. Katzmann, ed. 1995)
(exploring through a collection of essays the importance of public service pro bono commitments as a vital component of law firm practice); Deborah Rhode, Cultures of Commitment:
Pro Bono for Lawyers and Law Students, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2415 (1999) (arguing for the
importance of pro bono lawyering because it provides justice to the poor as well as an opportunity for many attorneys to have "their only direct contact with what passes for justice among
the poor"); Tigan W. Eldred & Thomas Schuenherr, The Lawyers Duty of Public Service:
More Than Charity?, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 367 (1993) (positing that lawyers have a fundamental
duty to provide legal service to the poor because of the legal profession's control of the provision and distribution of legal services).
87 Jeffrey Standen, The Production of Pro Bono, 12 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 631.
88 Id. at 632.
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amples can be given of rules that point in the opposite direction, suggesting that lawyers' self regulation in their own self- and class interests
can work against the public interest. One such example involves the
recent debate-surrounding the ABA's adoption of new model rules at
the start of this century-about whether lawyers should continue to be
prohibited from disclosing financial wrongdoing by their clients.8 9 To
argue that lawyers' self-regulation is always in the public interest surely
is Panglosian to the extreme. Indeed, even classic law-and-economics
theory would predict otherwise, and would explain the need for regulation by the fact that in imperfect markets collective action problems must
be solved by means other than the self-interested actions of economically
rational actors. 90
Standen ison more stable footing to the extent that he claims that
the emergence of informal ethics norms can in particularinstances serve
public interest objectives by meshing lawyers' self-interest with the public interest. Standen makes an interesting and provocative point in suggesting that the pro bono ethic endorsed by elite lawyers at the turn of the
twentieth century served the function of signaling class and professional
standing-in other words, of signaling that one was doing well enough
professionally to have substantial time and resources to spare to serve the
public interest.9 1 There is clearly something to this argument, and it indirectly supports my argument that the elite lawyers' model we sometimes
assume to be the only model for "pro bono" lawyering 92 is not the only
available model. Elite lawyers may want to signal their professional
standing by accepting work for no fee, as the term "pro bono" connotes,
93
but that is not the literal meaning of the words "for the public good.
89 Indeed, insiders identify the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission's failure to amend Model
Rule 1.6 to provide for disclosure of financial wrongdoing by corporate clients as one of the
direct causal predicates to the passage of Section 307 the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15
U.S.C. § 7245 (2002). That statute calls on the SEC to issue regulations placing affirmative
obligations on lawyers to discover and disclose financial improprieties when representing clients regulated by federal securities law. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys (proposed July 30, 2002) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 205), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-8150.htm. Sarbanes-Oxley may signal the beginning of
the end of the United States system of lawyer regulation built primarily on professional selfregulation.
90 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 271 (2d ed. 1977)

(explaining need for public regulation in terms of market failure).
91 Standen, supra note 87 at 635.
92 See, e.g., Brophy, supra note 56, at 624 (arguing that public interest work "is different
from soliciting clients for money") (emphasis in original).
93 Carle, supra note 3, at 731-32. No fee representation is not, after all, the only way in
which public interest law could be practiced. The assumption that public interest and no-fee
lawyering are synonymous blocks recognition of creative arrangements that depend on accepting some fees from clients, and which could provide new viable models for public interest
law in today's resource-scarce era. See Carle, supra note 3, at 731-32.
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Standen uses law and economics to arrive at an approach that explains the existence of norms promoting elite lawyers' public interest
involvement by pointing to the "public goods" these norms promote-as,
for example, the public benefits of the NAACP's work dismantling de
jure race discrimination. 94 In this respect, Standen's approach is very
much like another leading theoretical approach: Parsonian structuralfunctionalism. The structuralist-functionalist approach to understanding
lawyers' civic service commitments is used by some sociologists of the
profession, such as Terrence Halliday, to explain these commitments in
terms of the "functions" they serve-most often, the collective action
problems they solve. 95 Just as Standen suggests that the public service
ethic of the lawyers in my study led them to donate social capital to the
fledgling NAACP, which in turn allowed that organization to work
against racial injustice in U.S. society, Halliday argues that the elite bar's
public service ethic motivated the profession to tackle problems the state
would otherwise have been unable to address due to limited resources or
96
other constraints.
This explanation, however, bears the classic flaw of all functional
explanation. It tautologically explains the existence of the institution
under study-here, the early NAACP legal committee members' public
service ethic-by what that institution ended up accomplishingnamely, aiding an organization that made outstanding contributions in
the public interest. In addition, this approach fails to give us a framework to ask the many important critical questions that arise from the
involvement of elite lawyers in public interest law movements. It does
not help us distinguish when or how elite lawyers' involvement in public
interest issues is for the good and when or how it may be more
problematic.
In short, a focus on how elite lawyers' involvement in the early
NAACP helped produce public goods does not get us far enough in theorizing about the relationship between elite class interests and the development of public interest law.
C.

RICHARD ABEL'S DUAL APPROACHES

If neither Auerbach nor Halliday, despite their widely different perspectives, gets us far enough in conceptualizing the issues raised by elite
lawyers' involvement in shaping legal ethics norms regarding public in94 See Standen, supra note 87, at 633-34 (arguing that the lawyers who became involved

in the NAACP and furthered its agenda produced "desirable public goods," and that the
NAACP, in competing with other civil rights organizations to establish a national organization
as I describe, "generated substantial public benefits that continue to accrue to this day.").
95

See, e.g.,

TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, BEYOND MONOPOLY: LAWYERS, STATE CRISES, AND

PROFESSIONAL EMPOWERMENT (1987).
96 See id. at 370.
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terest practice, then perhaps other leading theorists' approaches can help
us more. One such approach might be found in the sociological work of
Richard Abel, a leading expert on many of the world's legal professions. 97 In some of his work, Abel applies what he calls a "Weberian
98
social closure model" to analyze the professional regulation project.
As he notes, he chooses this approach over several alternatives, 99 including structural functionalism, because he is interested in studying the legal
profession primarily in its economic dimension, as an organized group
activity based on enhancing its members' competitive advantage with
goals including "economic rewards and social status."' 0 0 In this respect,
the Weberian social closure model has a similar focus to Auerbach's, as
just discussed. It is an improvement, however, because, as applied, social closure theory limits its asserted scope to those areas of professional
regulation that involve enhancing members' competitive advantage. In
other words, social closure theory seeks to understand professional regulation in its economic dimensions but does not, at least as Abel presents
it, insist that all professional regulation projects have no purpose or effect other than enhancing lawyers' economic and status rewards.
Nevertheless, given our focus on the legal profession's largely unremunerative activities in the public service arena, the Weberian social
closure model appears to offer only limited assistance. Applying social
closure theory, one might argue that the involvement in the early
NAACP of the lawyers I studied was indirectly motivated by a desire to
advance their social status, and thus their opportunities for remunerative
work in the future. That hypothesis does not convincingly account for
97 E.g., RICHARD L. ABEL & PHILIP S.C. LEWIS, eds., LAWYERS IN SOCIETY (1988) (per-

forming, in a three-volume collection, a comparative analysis on the legal professions of common and civil law countries); RICHARD L. ABEL, THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN ENGLAND AND
WALES (1988) (conducting a massive study of the legal profession in England and Wales).
98 E.g., RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 17 (1989) (stating that he finds the
Weberian approach the most illuminating.)
99 The two main alternative approaches Abel identifies include a Marxist focus on class
conflict, which Abel rejects because the questions surrounding how to conceptualize lawyers'
professional regulation do not readily lend themselves to a class conflict analysis, and Parsonian structural functionalism, which theorizes professions as serving socially integrative
functions. See id. at 14-40. Abel rejects the later structuralist functionalist approach, discussed supra text accompanying notes 96-97, on the grounds that law firms "as economic
groupings, are marginal to structural functionalism, which is concerned with community, altruism and self-governance." Id. at 15-21. As I have already discussed, I concur with Abel's
conclusion that it is not particularly helpful to apply either of these approaches to the problem
of understanding lawyers' class status and their involvement in public interest law, because
neither offer enough explanatory power to understand this phenomenon. Even though a structural functionalist approach might appear to have relevance to my questions, since the focus of
my exploration is on lawyers' public service work, that approach simply posits that the lawyers in my study were seeking to advance the public good and solve market failure or collective action problems through their public service.
100 Id. at 15.
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the motives of the early NAACP lawyers I describe, however, for at least
two reasons. First, racial equality was not a popular cause at the time. '0 '
Second, some of the lawyers I studied, such as Arthur Spingarn (a largely
unsung hero who deserves further study by a biographer), worked much
harder and longer for the NAACP than ever could be accounted for by
any reasonable expectation of increased status or other external
02

reward. 1

But one aspect of Abel's approach to analyzing the legal profession
as a profit-making enterprise is worth noting-namely, the fact that Abel
generally endows his legal actors with a relatively self-aware sense of
their motives. Unlike approaches such as Auerbach' s, which tend to talk
in terms of actors who believe themselves to be engaged in one project
while they are in fact carrying out an entirely different one, Abel's actors
tend to have a pretty good sense of what they are doing. In engaging in
"strategies of social closure,"' 1 3 for example, the actors involved in the
early twentieth-century campaign to raise the educational and entrance
examination bars to legal practice acknowledge that the empirical evidence does not support the public interest rationales for their initiatives,
yet they take these steps anyway.' °4 In this respect, Abel's approach to
professional regulation is refreshing. Even if lawyers' motives in professional regulation projects are not the altruistic ones commonly ascribed
to them, these lawyers are at least fairly aware of what they are trying to
do. Under Abel's account, the effects of these lawyers' actions generally
fall somewhere within the range of what they are trying to accomplish,
rather than absolutely nowhere near their stated objectives.
Another strikingly refreshing aspect of Abel's work-which he
shares with most of the other theorists I discuss here-is his deep commitment to public interest law and to fostering future generations of lawyers who decide to use their law degrees for purposes more socially
beneficial than making large sums of money. Abel has written a great
deal about this,' 0 5 and, as one would expect in light of the manner in
101 See LINK & MCCORMICK, supra note 15, at 32-33, 96-97 (noting racism of the Progressive period).
102 Wilkins Response, supra note I, at 155.
103 ABEL, supra note 98, at 15.
104 Id. at 47; see also id. at 72 (noting that the "more candid" bar examiners sometimes
explicitly admit their motives of controlling the lawyer supply flow by manipulating bar passage rates).
See, e.g., RICHARD L. ABEL, POLITICS BY OTHER MEANS: LAW IN THE STRUGGLE
AGAINST APARTHEID, 1980-1994 (1995) (chronicling efforts of legal activists in struggle
against apartheid); Richard L. Abel, Lawyers and the Power to Change, 7 L. & POL. 5 (1985);
105

Richard L. Abel, Taking ProfessionalismSeriously, 1989 ANNUAL SURVEY OF AMERICAN LAW

41, 63 (arguing that "[t]aking professionalism seriously will require profound social change");
Richard L. Abel, What is the Assistance of Counsel Effective For?, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 165 (1986) (discussing and critiquing values implicit in legal requirements to effec-

tive assistance of counsel).
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which he carefully conceptualizes his theoretical approach to the study of
the U.S. legal profession as an economic enterprise, he does not try to fit
his examination of public interest lawyers into a Weberian social closure
framework.
Instead, Abel's foremost concern in his writing about public interest
law is with questions of meaning and identity construction. In one recent
article, for example, he asks how we can create alternative prestige hierarchies and systems of values within law schools that will define public
interest law as a high status, appealing career alternative.' 0 6 Here he
strives mightily to come up with approaches with immediate practical
applications. Abel wants to buck the observed trends that show declines
in new lawyers' entrance into jobs that have significant public interest
dimensions. Studying the processes by which an alternative culture of
committed public interest lawyers arose and maintained itself in the
1970s, Abel looks for ways to recreate such a culture today, advocating,
for example, the setting of competitive admissions criteria and valuable
perks for law students enrolled in public interest law programs at some of
the nation's leading law schools.' 0 7 What interests him in this context is
creating and promoting meanings that lawyers can ascribe to public interest work.
Abel is not one to argue nostalgically for a return to the "good old
days," but one does get the impression that he is very much a pragmatist-in the nontechnical sense-in his approach to fostering new generations of public interest lawyers. Even conceding all of the flaws and
problems with our historically received models of how to engage in professional practice, including public interest law, Abel enthusiastically advocates the continuance of public service traditions, because the
alternative-no such tradition at all-is far worse.
Here I wholeheartedly agree with Abel. It seems important to find
models for thinking about elite lawyers' involvement in public interest
law movements that encourage, rather than discourage, such involvement, but do so in a way that promotes thoughtful reflection about how
lawyers' class status and concomitant social, economic, and political
power operate in the context of such movements. Thus Abel's work provides us with some helpful directions in considering how to theorize
class issues in the context of the development of ethics norms concerning
public interest law.
106 Richard L. Abel, Choosing, Nurturing, Trainingand PlacingPublic Interest Llw Students, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1563 (2002) (outlining proposals to foster public interest law

students and lawyers).
107 See id. at 1568. These schools include UCLA, Fordham, and American University
Washington College of Law.
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ROBERT GORDON

The last theorist I will consider here, Robert Gordon, is an historian
rather than a social theorist per se. Gordon advocates an approach I find
most helpful in thinking about the questions raised by my research on the
NAACP. In a series of articles aimed at studying the public service ideologies of elite corporate lawyers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 10 8 Gordon has proposed a thesis that is elegant in both its
simplicity and its explanatory power.
Gordon's main focus is on late nineteenth and early twentieth century lawyers who were engaged in moderate reform causes-lawyers
who might have moved in the same professional circles as the NAACP
lawyers I studied. 10 9 Gordon is interested in understanding what ideologies motivated the elite corporate lawyers he studied to engage in public
service work. In thinking about this question, Gordon rejects the "instrumental" approaches other legal historians have used to assess these lawyers' roles in defending and advancing the cause of capitalism. 10
Gordon argues against the position that these lawyers should be understood as having been primarily engaged in manipulating law to serve
their clients' ends. Instead, Gordon suggests that we should seek to identify the purposes of the moderate reform projects in which these lawyers
were engaged "precisely where instrumental explanations decline to
search for it"" '-not in any ulterior motives that these lawyers may
have held while working with legal doctrine, but in the substance of the
legal ideas they were developing.
What Gordon finds most interesting about these lawyers' reform
projects is the way in which they were working to develop ideologies
1o8 See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise, 1870-1920, in PROFESSIONALS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70
(Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983) [hereinafter Legal Thought and Legal Practice]; Robert W.
Gordon, "The Ideal and the Actual in the Law": Fantasiesand Practices of New York City
Lawyers, 1870-1910, in THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 51
(Gerard W. Gawalt ed., 1984) [hereinafter Ideal and Actual].
109 Here it is worth noting that the race reform project of the NAACP's early lawyers was
also a fairly moderate cause; these lawyers were far from radicals, and some held views on
race issues, such as interracial social mixing, that would be viewed as appallingly prejudiced
today. See Carle, Legal Ethics and the Early NAACP, supra note 1, at 104 & nn. 28, 29
(describing these attitudes and citing additional sources). I do think it fair to say, however,
that the NAACP legal committee members had quite a bit of backbone, relatively speaking, in

championing political equality among the races. As other historians have noted, this was not a
particularly popular Progressive reform cause, so that, on this issue at least, the lawyers I
investigated were probably somewhat farther "to the left" than were many of those Gordon
studied. The way in which they were very similar to Gordon's lawyers was in their socioeconomic and professional status.
110 See Legal Thought and Legal Practice,supra note 109, at 71 (rejecting instrumental
approaches to legal history of the late nineteenth century for failing to take account of the
"doctrinal content of law on its own terms").
I]

Id. at8l.
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that allowed them to reconcile their ideals about law with the realities of
their law practice. This approach, as Gordon notes elsewhere, allows us
to approach the study of lawyers' reform projects by looking at what
these lawyers "were thinking and doing more or less as they themselves
saw it."112
Gordon proposes that what these lawyers were doing, and what they
thought they were doing and wanted to be doing, was seeking to develop
a coherent and rationalized unitary "science of law," which they could
then apply to help them represent their clients in a manner that served
both their clients and the public interest." 3 Gordon sees a similar purpose in the slightly later Progressive lawyers' notions of law as "a tool
14
for the efficient management of the social order in the public interest."'
These ideas likewise came to provide the dominant understanding of
lawyers' appropriate role in shaping law and legal institutions. In short,
what matters to Gordon is how these lawyers, at the top of the profession's status hierarchy, were creating ideas-ideologies, if you willabout law that have continued to play influential roles on the development of legal doctrine in the United States throughout the twentieth
century.
Similar points can be drawn from my research on the NAACP.
That research highlights the power a small band of elite lawyers could
have over the development of legal ethics norms for the practice of public interest law. They, along with many others affiliated with other public service causes,' 15 practiced public interest law according to one
particular model, pro bono work while maintaining well-funded, corporate law practices. But in the same time period, others with less elite
standing and fewer resources practiced public interest law according to a
very different, grass roots model, which blended public and private work
and accepted legal fees wherever possible, in order to keep these small
practices afloat.' 16 In the end, the model of public interest law endorsed
by the U.S. Supreme Court was that of the elite practitioners, maintaining
a strict separation between public and private interest and thus rendering
invisible non-elite models of how public interest practice could or should
be practiced.
Gordon is far from a naive booster of this public service ethic of
elite, turn-of-the-century corporate lawyers. He does, however, argue
112 Gordon, Ideal and Actual, supra note 109, at 53.
''3
Id. at 55.
1 14 id. at 66.
115 See, e.g., Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as People's
Lawyer, 105 YALE L. J. 1445 (1996) (analyzing public interest advocacy model reflected in

work of Louis Brandeis).
116 See Carle, Legal Ethics and the Early NAACP, supra

ing this point).

note 1,at 113-14, 120-21 (mak-

2003]

CLASS INTERESTS AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION

599

strenuously that at least some aspects of what these lawyers were doing
through their involvement in civic reform projects were valuable and
worth preserving-or, more accurately, restoring, since, as Gordon laments, much of the public service ethic that motivated these lawyers to
devote substantial time to civic reform work has faded today. 117 As
Gordon puts it, quoting Vaclav Havel and opposing doctrinaire Marxists,
"there are no privileged locations or levers for social change, and also no
positions from which pressure for change, involving whatever tiny, mod18
est risks the participants are willing to take, is not possible."' '
This quote captures part of what I find most refreshing about
Gordon's analysis of the operation of class and class privilege in studying lawyers' public service involvements. Gordon argues that lawyers
who have power by virtue of their elite professional and socio-economic
class positions should try to use this power for positive, public interest
purposes: they should care about how the world around them could be
improved, and should strive for those improvements. He recognizes that
these efforts may miss the mark-that the reforms such lawyers envision
and strive to achieve will inevitably be shaped by these lawyers' personal
perspectives, and thus may not lead to the kinds of profound or fundamental change really needed. But despite his strong awareness of how
elite lawyers' reform projects can never go far enough, he supports their
former ethic of public service because it is better than the alternative.
That alternative is a "law as business" mentality that sees lawyers merely
as hired guns and debunks the idea of law as a public service profession.
As reflected in the recent declines in pro bono hours reported by major
law firms,11 9 the "law as business" viewpoint seems to be growing increasingly dominant, perhaps in part because attitudes towards the
"good" lawyers can achieve through public service work have been so
heavily critiqued. Gordon stands as an important example of nuanced
approaches to the study of class in the legal profession because, despite
117 See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law Practiceas a Public Calling, 49 MD. L.
REV. 255, 265-66 (1990) (calling for corporate lawyers to establish an ethic that understood
lawyering work as a public calling, guided by "a lively sense of social responsibility" for their
own and their clients' practices); Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1988) (calling for a return to lawyers' earlier ethic of relative independence from
their corporate clients) (hereinafter Independence of Lawyers].
118 Gordon, Independence of Lawyers, supra note 118, at 83.
119 See, e.g., Lisa G. Lerman, The Slippery Slope from Ambition to Greed to Dishonesty:
Lawyers, Money, and ProfessionalIntegrity, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 879, 885 (2002) (emphasizing a thirty-five percent drop in the 100 top-earning law firms' average pro bono hours between 1992 and 1999, despite an increase in earnings); Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice,
69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1810 (2001) ("[O]nly eighteen of the nation's 100 most financially
successful firms meet the ABA's standard of hours per year of pro bono service."); Greg
Winter, Legal Firms Cutting Back on Free Services for Poor,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2000, at

Al (detailing a significant decline in the number of pro bono hours performed by top law firms
in the 1990s).
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his piercing understanding of the limited results of lawyers' civic reform
projects at the turn of the last century, he nevertheless champions a revival of this effort. He assumes that it is better to make some contribution
than to give up altogether on the project of using elite lawyers' vast political and social power for the public good.
I confess to some initial ambivalence (sometimes even expressed in
print) 120 about the call, led by scholars such as Gordon, William Simon,
and David Luban,' 2' for a return to the public service mentality of the
elite lawyers of the Progressive Era, or, as other leading legal ethicists
such as Russell Pearce have suggested, to even earlier eras, such as to the
models of lawyering embedded within traditions of "civic republicanism."'122 But I now understand why these scholars fought against the

complete debunking of such flawed historical traditions, and I join the
suggestion, even if only implicit in their work, that there are insights of
great value to be obtained by investigating the internal world views of
lawyers engaged in sustained public service, including-but, I would
strongly emphasize, not limited to-those of the bar's economic and social elite.
CONCLUSION
What then do I think my study of the NAACP's first legal committee members might contribute to these efforts to better understand the
bar's public service traditions and to resurrect and refurbish them for a
new century? This is a very broad topic, and I will therefore limit myself
here to three major points in conclusion.
First, I think it is important to understand elite public service traditions in comparison to activist traditions that tend to be overshadowed by
120 See, e.g., Carle, Re-valuing Lawyering, supra note 3, at 741-42 (questioning some
aspects of Simon's approach); see also Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis
as People's Lawyer, supra note 116 (questioning the unqualified praise given to the elite,
independent public interest lawyer model personified by Louis Brandeis).
121 See, e.g., Gordon, Independence of Lawyers, supra note 118, at 80-83 (refuting leftist
critiques of modest reform power of elite lawyers in Progressive, New Deal, and Great Society
generations); David Luban, The Noblesse Oblige Tradition in the Practice of Law, 41 VAND.
L. REV. 717, 736 (1988) (arguing for return to "progressive professionalism," which "presents
an ideal for elite law firm practice that is infinitely more attractive than ... law practice that
serves no purpose but to help the rich get richer"); William H. Simon, Babbitt v. Brandeis: The
Decline of the Professional Ideal, 37 STAN. L. REV. 565 (1985) (suggesting that some of the
traditional themes of professional vision of Brandeis and others are worth retaining); William
H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1083 (1988) (arguing
that lawyers should seek to "do justice" in their cases).
122 See Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Ethics
Codes, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETimcs 241 (1992) (uncovering and analyzing influence of civic republicanism in early legal ethics codes).
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elite models of public interest law. 123 Thus, for example, as I examined
in my earlier research, one of the most important dynamics at work in the
NAACP's first legal committee were those between more and less privileged lawyers and activists. 124 The more privileged lawyers had more
resources and the luxury of working for free, and thought, sometimes
correctly and sometimes not, that they knew a great deal more and
should be controlling the direction of the early NAACP's legal work.125
These more privileged lawyers further embraced the idea that lawyering
in the public interest should not involve accepting fees, and, for obvious
practical reasons, there was much tension between the national NAACP
office and outside counsel, including African-American counsel, over
questions of how the organization's very limited funds should be
26
allocated. 1
These tensions reflected in a microcosm tensions that exist in public
interest practice generally: in history, 127 in the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisprudence on constitutional protections for public interest practice, 128
and in prevailing paradigms concerning the definition of public interest
123 1 thus disagree with my commentator who states that we need to talk about people
outside the mainstream, "ratherthan focusing on legal elites." Brophy, supra note 56, at 625
(emphasis added). I think we need to talk about reformers of all types, and examine their
relationships to each other.
124 See, e.g., Carle, Legal Ethics and the Early NAACP, supra note 1, at 113-14, 122-25
(describing these dynamics between privileged, white lawyers and less privileged AfricanAmerican lawyers within the early NAACP); Carle, Re-envisioning Models for Pro Bono
Lawyering, supra note 37, at 84-92 (describing these dynamics within both the NAACP and
the National Consumers League).
125 See, e.g., Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Principle and Prejudice: The Supreme Court and
Race in the ProgressiveEra: Part 1: The Heyday of Jim Crow, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 444, 485,
492-93 (1982) (suggesting that McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe RR Co., 235 U.S.
151 (1914), a case seemingly lost by African-American lawyers litigating independently of the
NAACP, in fact led the way to overruling the Court's separate-but-equal doctrine); see also
Carle, Legal Ethics and the Early NAACP, supra note 1, at 123-24 (describing McCabe litigation, NAACP's refusal to participate in it, and NAACP's harsh criticism of its results).
126 See, e.g., Carle, Legal Ethics and Early NACCP, supra note I at 118-119 (describing
some of these tensions).
127 See, e.g., Spillenger, supra note 116, at 1449 (critiquing ideas underlying famous early
public interest lawyer Louis Brandeis' refusal to accept fees from clients when undertaking
public interest representations).
128 See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (granting constitutional protection under
the First Amendment to lawyers engaged in public interest practice, defined as work related to
public political issues, carried out in the nonprofit organizational form); In re Primus, 436 U.S.
412 (extending Button approach to ACLU attorney who solicited client); Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (distinguishing and refusing to grant any constitutional
protections in solicitation case involving an attorney in private practice); see also Derrick Bell,
Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School DesegregationLitigation, 85 YALE L. J. 470 (1976) (critiquing the way in which Button contributed to the construction of a non-client focused for civil rights lawyers litigating school desegregation remedies in
the post-Brown era).
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practice today. These conceptions in turn influence how, by whom, and
129
where public interest law is currently practiced.
The story of the NAACP thus presents one example illustrating the
importance of studying the activities of elite lawyers relationally. One
such relationship is that between elite lawyers and their far less powerful
clients, as a large and growing body of literature investigates.130 Another
such relationship that I believe legal ethics scholarship should explore in
greater depth is that between elite and less elite lawyers and sectors of
the bar.
Second, I think it is worth focusing on the ideas about public service
practice that the lawyers themselves express. Those ideas may be misguided, but they are at least part of the story, especially to the extent
one's scholarship is in part motivated by a desire to find or generate
ideas that might help sustain future lawyers' motivations to engage in
public interest practice. 13 1 Put otherwise, what lawyers think they are
doing often may not be what they actually achieve, but it is at least part
of the story and deserves careful attention.
Third, and finally, it seems to me that an important issue for future
study involves tracing the specific details of the operation of elite lawyers' power in public interest law movements. The concept of power, of
course, is very much in vogue in some parts of the legal academy today,
often borrowed from so-called "post-modern"' 132 French social theorists
such as Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu. Foucault has traced the
operation of power in the construction of changing conceptions of human
129 See Carle, Revaluing Lawyering for Middle-Income Clients, supra note 3, at 739.
130 Classics in this genre include GERALD P. LOPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING (Westview
Press 1992); DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 341-57 (1988); Stephen Ellmann, Client-CenterednessMultiplied: Individual Autonomy and Collective Mobilization in Public Interest Lawyers' Representation of Groups, 78 VA. L. REV. 1103 (1992);
Deborah L. Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1183 (1982).
A related literature on the ethics of individual client representation in the poverty law context
has also emphasized the need for client-centered lawyering that is sensitive to the expressed
interests of clients and engages in a process of dialogue in lieu of lawyer domination. See,
e.g., Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refinement, 32 ARIZ.
L. J. 501 (1990); Binny Miller, Give Them Back Their Lives: Recognizing Client Narrative in
Case Theory, 93 MICH. L. REV. 485 (1994); Lucie E. White, Subordination, Rhetorical Survival Skills, and Sunday Shoes: Notes on the Meaning of Mrs. G., 38 BUFF. L. REV. 58 (1990).
131 Cf. Abel, Choosing, Nurturing, Training and Placing Public Interest Law Students,
supra note 107, at 1571 (expressing importance of finding ideas conferring status and honor on
students who choose career paths in public interest law).
132 Questions concerning the definition of the term post-modem and who should be classified as such are highly contested. See, e.g., Structuralism and Poststructuralism (interview
by Gerard Raulet of Michael Foucault), in MICHEL FOUCAULT, AESTHETICS, METHOD, AND
EPISTEMOLOGY 433, 448 (James Faubion, ed., New York Press 1998) (Foucault stating that "I
do not understand what kind of problem is common to the people we call 'post moder' or
'poststructuralist'"); see generally Kathryn Abrams, Afterword: Critical Strategy and the Judicial Evasion of Difference, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1426, 1437 n. 52 (2000) (discussing working
definitions for post modernism and related terms).
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agents, or "Subjects," in a series of historical inquiries addressing a vari33
ety of topics including sexuality, punishment, and mental illness.
Convincingly demonstrating the many different ways power has worked
historically to construct reigning discourses about human subjects with
respect to these topics, Foucault conceives of power as a force field involving complex, historically variable, and multidimensional forces. 134
As Foucault explains, power "must be analyzed as something which circulates." 135 It is never localized here or there ... never appropriated as a
36
commodity."1
Foucault's compatriot, Bourdieu, has studied the operation of power
specifically in relation to class identity, showing how the processes that
shape human identity also create and perpetuate socioeconomic classes. 137 As Bourdieu documents in a multimedia presentation of photographs, statistics, newspaper clippings, and charts, the development of
class-based aesethics in turn affects every aspect of life, including one's
taste in politics, dress, food, art and careers.' 38 A fruitful area of legal
ethics scholarship might explore similar themes concerning the correlations between lawyers' class locations and their professional practice
styles, values, and aspirations.
The question thus becomes: How useful might these so-called
postmodern conceptions of class and power be to the project of legal
ethics scholarship? To my view, these conceptions are very helpful, to a
point-provided that their chic French origins do not disguise either an
absence of analysis or a lack of skepticism about the flaws in these, as in
all, theoretical approaches. Foucault and Bourdieu, each from somewhat
different angles, could potentially help jumpstart a conversation about
class and legal ethics norms that is currently being held too infrequently
and among too small a set of legal ethics scholars in the United Stateswith some notable exceptions, of course, including Abel and Gordon,
who both do place class at the center of their analyses, as already discussed. Foucault heightens our awareness of the many ways in which
power operates through informal mechanisms, presenting "force fields"
that bend human intent to purposes other than those of the intenders.
133 See, e.g., MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON
(Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d. ed. 1995) (1978) (tracing historically changing approaches to punishment); MICHEL FOUCAULT, HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (Robert Hurley trans.,
Vintage Books 1990) (1978) (undertaking similar historical analysis of constructions of sexuality); MICHEL FOUCAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION (Vintage Books 1988) (1965).
134 FOUCAULT, MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWERIKNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND
OTHER WRITINGS 1972-1977 98 (Colin Gordon ed., Pantheon Books 1980) (1972).

135 Id.
136 Id.
137 See PIERRE BOURDIEU, DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGMENT OF TASTE
175 (Richard Nice trans., Harv. Univ. Press 1984) (1979).
138 Id.
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Bourdieu likewise emphasizes the pervasive, all-encompassing nature of
socialization-into socio-economic classes, and, we might posit, into
sectors of professional endeavor as well. 39 Both offer approaches that
reject vulgar materialism and instead focus on historical contingency, local variability and detail. In this way, both theorists provide models of
the kind of work that could be done by focusing on the operation of
power within the legal profession and in the relationships among various
sectors of the legal profession and other institutions.
In short, it seems to me that a particular focus on the operation of
power in various locations within the legal profession could be a very
illuminating avenue for further scholarship. This, indeed, is one way of
viewing the approach Robert Gordon takes in his work, as already summarized above. Gordon shows how elite lawyers' power in the decades
prior to and following the turn of the twentieth century served to map an
agenda in legal doctrine that had sustained force through that century.
Turning back to the example of the early NAACP with which I opened
this Essay, I concluded that the existence of great professional power
among the profession's elite sometimes historically provided-and could
still potentially provide, as I have just argued-a helpful asset for struggling public interest law movements, as the elite members of the first
NAACP legal committee offered the early NAACP on the legal ethics
front, for example. At other times, however, as I have also suggested,
such power has been counterproductive to the achievement of the goals
140
public interest activists defined for themselves.
It thus seems to me, in final conclusion, that the careful study of
how elite lawyers' power operates in the construction of ethics norms
and traditions for public interest law practice presents an important area
for additional research. To be most fruitful, that research should avoid
both of two unhelpful extremes, either assuming that the operation of
such power is always bad, as a strong version of Auerbach's approach
might conclude, or, in what seems to me the equally dangerous, opposite
extreme, assuming that the unreflective use of such power in the context

139 Bourdieu has been criticized, somewhat convincingly in my view, for having an unduly static conception of class arising out of the particular historio-political situation he studied in modern France. See, e.g., James Bohman, Practical Reason and Cultural Constraint:
Agency in Bourdieu's Theory of Practice, in BOURDIEU: A CRITICAL READER 129, 143 (Richard Shusterman ed., 1999) (arguing that Bourdieu's conception of socioeconomic class is too
rigid and "eliminates the very possibility of transformation that it is supposed to describe").
140 See Carle, supra note 38, at 84-92 (discussing the way in which both the NAACP and
the National Consumers' League's heavy reliance on elite lawyers for legitimacy and legal
direction can be argued to have interfered with or slowed down those organizations' advocacy
agendas).
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of public interest law practice is always to the good.' 4 ' The real trick, it
seems to me, is to construct ideas that both motivate lawyers to use their
social, political, and economic power for progressive reform, and impose, as a matter of legal ethical norms, restraints on the use of that
power to avoid the dangers of its misuse in the fragile context of public
interest law movements.

141 This is a criticism, for example, that can be leveled against Parsonian structuralistfunctionalist models for analysis of the legal profession, as noted previously in text. See text
following note 100.

